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TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES ACT:
THE LEGISLATIVE GAP
WALTER A. RAFALKO*
The fact is that the practice of the sciences has usually been
in advance of the contemporary philosophy of science....
While lawyers would do well, to be sure, to learn scientific
logic from the expositors of scientific method, it is far more im-
portant that they catch the spirit of the creative scientist, which
yearns not for safety but risk, not for certainty but adventure,
which thrives on experimentation, invention and novelty and not
on nostalgia for the absolute, which devotes itself to new ways
of manipulating protean particulars and not for the quest of
undeviating universals.
JUDGE FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, 98
(6th ed. 1949)
INTRODUCTION
Judge Frank could have added that not only is the practice of science
ahead of the philosophy of science but both are in advance of the prac-
tice and philosophy of law. The social sciences, such as law, have in-
variably tended to lag behind the physical sciences and, today, there is
little doubt that scientific technology has come of age. Due to scientific
technology, industry is growing at a tremendous pace especially in the
aviation, pharmaceutical, electronic, computer, automotive and television
fields. With the United States Government, in 1967, appropriating $16-17
billion for further research and development, primarily for the atomic
energy program, the effect can not only be an acceleration of additional
scientific progress but, also, further disruption of the status quo in our
society. Moreover, this type of research and development only serves to
widen the gap between scientific technology and the legal process which
seeks to protect a member's rights in our society. This writer estimates
that the time span from an invention of a gadget to its regulation by a
legislative body is approximately 30 years. The normal cycle usually
includes: discovery of the invention; exploitation of the technology;
emergence of the personal injuries; establishment of proximate causa-
tion; commencement of court litigation; courts groping for the applicable
legal principles; legislative intervention if necessary, to prohibit certain
* B.S. St. Louis University; LL.B., Boston University; LL.M., Georgetown University;
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conduct; and further court interpretation once the statute is passed. If
the invention creates a social problem, the legal system must respond
accordingly. It is well to remember that the courts will operate retrospec-
tively after the social problem has been initially created. On the other
hand, the legislatures can deal with the social problem prospectively, even
barring the item from the market place completely, as they have with
some narcotics, or restricting its use, such as transportation of explo-
sives, under certain conditions. The scientific technological benefits of
explosives, radioactive materials, etiological agents, and other dangerous
articles are obvious but so are their dangers. How should these
dangerous articles be handled and controlled? This question has par-
tially been answered by the Congressional enactment of the "Transpor-
tation of Explosives Act"' on September 6, 1960. The Act made it a
federal crime for any person to knowingly transport, carry or convey
within the United States any dangerous explosives.' This article attempts
to examine: the purposes of the Act; analyze the provisions of the act;
judicial decisions interpreting the Act; and inferentially, the manner in
which safety determinations are made to solve a vexing problem in
democracy-regulatory or police power versus individual freedom.
PURPOSES OF THE ACT
The purpose of this latest Act was to revise and update the provisions
of the Transportation of Explosives Act3 which was first enacted in
1908. This Act had been amended from time to time,4 until it was revised
and acquired its present form.5 The Act brings the transportation of
radioactive materials and etiological agents under the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and extends the penalties for viola-
tions of the Act, which was applicable only to common carriers, to private
and contract carriers.
The original Act served its purpose adequately. However, a scientific
technological surge since 1908 has created a gigantic increase in the
private transportation of dangerous articles, such as radioactive materials
and etiological agents. In 1908, such materials were not known to any
great extent. The Interstate Commerce Commission had prescribed regu-
lations for such materials by classifying them as poisons. However,
etiological agents, such as live viruses, bacteria, etc., are not technically
poisons, so there was some question as to whether the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had the authority to prescribe regulations on such
commodities. The new Act corrects this situation and places the trans-
1. Explosive and Other Dangerous Articles, 18 U.S.C. §§ 831-835 (1966).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
3. May 30, 1908, Pub. L. 60-174, 35 Stat. 554.
4. June 25, 1948, Pub. L. 80-773, 62 Stat. 738.
5. Supra note 1.
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portation of these articles squarely within the jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
If one simply compares the statistics in motor vehicle registrations,
since the passage of the Transportation of Explosives Act of 1908, with
the situation existing today, the justification for including these addi-
tional materials under the Act to promote safety in the transportation of
explosives and dangerous articles becomes more meaningful. For
example, in 1900, about the time the first Act was passed, there were
only about 8000 motor vehicle registrations within the United States."
In 1960, there were over 73 million motor vehicle registrations. The In-
stitute of Makers of Explosives estimated that in 1957 about 612 million
pounds of commercial explosives were moved by motor vehicles for long-
distance hauls from manufacturing plants.7 At the same time, the in-
herently greater danger of these new materials are very obvious.
The provisions of the old Transportation of Explosives Act applied to
common carriers only and violations of its provisions were subject to
maximum penalties of $10,000 or 10 years imprisonment or both.' If a
private or contract carrier committed the very same violations, it could
have been prosecuted under section 322(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act which carries a maximum penalty of only $500.' The new Act does
away with this inequity and extends the provisions of the act to include
contract and private carriers.
The element of danger is just as great when explosives and other
dangerous articles are transported in intrastate commerce as when
transported in interstate commerce. For this reason, the Act extends the
present provisions relating to packing, marking, etc., to shippers tender-
ing articles to interstate carriers irrespective of whether the shipments
are destined for movement in interstate, intrastate, or foreign commerce,
and to all shipments of dangerous articles, including intrastate shipments
handled on interstate vehicles or commingled with interstate traffic.10
The Act further extends the provisions of the old Act to include all for-
hire carriers of passengers by land. Moreover, the old exemption of
specific quantities of various articles has been changed so as to authorize
the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe the kind, amounts,
and conditions under which such dangerous articles may be transported. 1
The new Act also modifies the provisions of the old Act relating to the
marking of packages to include the tendering of such articles to any
6. H.R. Rep. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960); 1960, U.S. Code Cong. and Adm.
News 3352.
7. Ibid.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 833 (1952).
9. 49 U.S.C. § 322(a) (1963).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 833 (1964).
11. i8 U.S.C. § 834 (1964).
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carrier by land or water and to any person carrying such articles upon
any interstate carrier by land, including private and contract, as well as
12common carriers.
The old Act prohibited the transportation of nitroglycerin or other
like explosives by common carriers, but there was no such prohibition
against the transportation of such commodities by contract or private
carriers.' This Act does not restrict any particular class of motor carriers
or persons in the transportation of these dangerous commodities, or of
radioactive materials or etiological agents, but it does strictly limit and
regulate their transportation by providing that they shall not be trans-
ported except under such rules and regulations as the Interstate Com-
merce Commission shall prescribe. 14 Congress concluded that this re-
striction has been found to be necessary in view of the heavy traffic
conditions and the increased volume of these commodities being cur-
rently transported.
PROVISIONS OF THE NEW ACT
The title of the chapter was changed from "Explosives and Combus-
tibles" to "Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles." This was done
because of the inclusion of radioactive materials and etiological agents.
Some new definitions were added in section 831: "carrier," "person,"
"for-hire carrier," "shipper," "interstate and foreign commerce,"
"United States," and "State." Also, the definitions of "radioactive ma-
terials," and "etiologic agents" were added by the Act.' 5 These technical
definitions were suggested by the Department of Defense and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission explosive experts.
Section 832(a) added radioactive materials and etiological agents to
the Act. The Act applies to any for-hire carrier in interstate and foreign
commerce by land. It provides that shipment of these commodities on
passenger cars may only be accomplished in emergency situations under
I.C.C. regulations: also, it provides that such articles may be carried in
small amounts and under such conditions prescribed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission; and the Act permits carrying of signal devices
and rockets necessary to the safety of the operation of the car or vehicle.
Section 832(b). The former section 833 related to the transportation
of nitroglycerin and formerly contained an absolute prohibition against
12. 18 U.S.C. § 833 (1964).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 833 (1952).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 831 (1964). "Radioactive materials 'so used in this chapter' means any
materials or combination of materials that spontaneously emit ionizing radiation.
'Etiologic agents' means the causative agent of such diseases as may from time to time
be listed in regulations governing etiologic agents prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission under Section 834 of this chapter."
[Vol. 6:131
TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES ACT
transportation of such sensitive commodities by a common carrier. The
new section 832(b) permits such transportation by common as well as
private and contract carriers, but only under such regulations prescribed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Radioactive materials and
etiological agents have also been included within this section. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission is also authorized to determine what con-
stitutes "other similarly dangerous explosives" and to prescribe the routes
over which such sensitive items shall be transported.
Section 832(c) is new and provides for the protection of the national
security where shipments of radioactive materials are escorted by per-
sonnel of the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission,
so as not to disclose the true contents when identity, or inspection
thereof, would or could be detrimental; but in an unescorted shipment
the packages may be opened for inspection by the Carrier.
Section 833 extends the marking package provision of the old Act to
any person delivering any explosive or other dangerous article to all
carriers by land and water, and to all persons carrying such articles 6n
any carrier by land, including private and contract as well as common
carriers.
Section 834(a) authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to
issue regulations to include specifically radioactive materials and etio-
logical agents and section 834(b) requires the Interstate Commerce
Commission to advise and consult with the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. Sections 834(c), (d), (e) and (f) of the new Act remain in force
and effect as they did under the former section 835.
Section 835 relates to the authorization and direction to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to administer the Act, conduct investiga-
tions, and hold hearings for adjudications and regulations and provides
the Interstate Commerce Commission with the powers conferred by the
Interstate Commerce Act in administering sections 831-835 of the Act.
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE OLD AND NEW ACT
The constitutionality of the Transportation of Explosives Act was
challenged in United States v. Boyce Motor Lines."6 The United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the old Act. The Court
pointed out the standards authorizing the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to formulate regulations for safe transportation of explosives
and other dangerous articles, including inflammable liquids, satisfy the
constitutional requirements and afford an adequate guide to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, so that this section is not invalid as an
16. 90 F. Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1950), rev'd in part on other grounds, 188 F.2d 889 (3d
Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
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unlawful delegation by Congress of its legislative power. Thus, as it was
determined in United States v. A & P Trucking Corp.,17 that it is wholly
competent for Congress to make a violation of an Interstate Commerce
Commission's rules and regulations a federal crime.
The validity of regulations pursuant to the old Act has similarly been
attacked. In United States v. Boyce Motor Lines," the regulation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission providing that drivers of motor
vehicles transporting any explosives, inflammable liquid, inflammable
compressed gas or poisonous gas shall avoid as far as practicable, and
where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through
congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car
tracks, tunnels, viaducts and dangerous crossings, is valid and sets forth
an ascertainable standard of guilt.'9 Further, in United States v. A & P
Trucking Corp.,20 the Federal District Court stated there is a presump-
tion that regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission were val-
idly promulgated pursuant to lawful authority and appropriate statutory
standards and, as such, these regulations have force and effect of law.
2
'
In construing regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the violation of which has been made a crime by Congress, the Federal
District Court will apply the same canons of construction and interpreta-
tion as are applied to statutes themselves.2  For this reason, regulations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the violation of which has been
made a crime by Congress, should be strictly construed in favor of the
accusedY A state court, in Huckleberry v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,24
recognized that 18 U.S.C.A. § 383 [now section 834] permitted regula-
tion by the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding the transporta-
tion of gasoline.
What persons are liable under the Act? The provisions making Inter-
state Commerce Commission regulations pertaining to safe transport of
dangerous articles binding on all common carriers engaged in interstate
commerce and providing that whoever knowingly violates such regula-
tions shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, must be construed in light
of the statute. Section 1 of Title 1 sets forth the rule that in determining
the meaning of this Act of Congress, unless context indicates otherwise,
the words "person" and "whoever" includes partnerships. Moreover, in
the light of congressional intent to insure compliance by all motor
17. 113 F. Supp. 549 (D.N.J. 1953).
18. Supra note 16.
19. Supra note 16 at 1000-1001.
20. Supra note 17.
21. Supra note 17 at 551.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S.W.2d 980 (1930).
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carriers, whether organized as corporations, joint stock companies, part-
nerships or individual proprietorships, with Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's safety requirements, the word "whoever" includes partnerships.
Such was the holding in United States v. A & P Trucking Co.25
The manifest purpose, then, of the rules promulgated by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, as expressed in Davis v. Gossett & Sons,26 is not
for the protection or advantage of either the shipper or consignee, but
solely for the protection and safety of the public and of railway em-
ployees from any accidents arising from the movement of shipments de-
fined as dangerous, during the course of their transportation from one
point to another.
As the Circuit Court of Appeals said in Aktiesselskabet Ingrid v. New
Jersey Central R. Co.,27 where the Interstate Commerce Commission
has formulated and issued regulations governing the transportation of
explosives in interstate and foreign commerce, a shipment while in
transitu will be subject to these regulations to the total exclusion of state
or local law. Clearly, in such a case, federal law is supreme.
As to what articles constitute explosives, a Federal District Court
held, in Houff Transfer v. United States,28 that the determination in the
first instance of what articles constitute explosives and dangerous articles
for which the Interstate Commerce Commission must formulate regula-
tions for safe transportation rests with the Commission, and a court
will not attempt wholesale review of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion regulations for the purpose of amendment at the instance of one
whose certificate of authority precludes carriage of all articles so classi-
fied.
In construing the terms of the statute or regulations, the Circuit Court
of Appeals held, in United States v. Chicago Exp., Inc.,29 that the word
"knowingly," in the provision that whoever knowingly violates any Inter-
state Commerce Commission regulation shall be fined, imprisoned, or
both, described a state of mind essential for responsibility, and removes
violations of relevant regulations from classification familiarly known as
malum prohibitum, public welfare and civil offenses.
In West Coast Fast Freight v. United States,"° regulation of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission designated four classes of explosives and
described those in "Class A" as explosives detonating or otherwise of
25. 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
26. 30 Ga. App. 576, 118 S.E. 773 (1932), aff'd, 158 Ga. 886, 124 S.E. 529 (1924).
27. 216 F. 72 (2d Cir. 1914; reh'g denied, 216 F. 991 (2d Cir. 1914); cert. den'd 238
U.S. 615 (1915).
28. 105 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Va. 1952).
29. 235 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1956).
30. 205 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1953).
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maximum hazard. The regulation included those explosives as dangerous,
within contemplation of exception to certificate of public convenience
and necessity, notwithstanding absence of express characterization of
such explosives as dangerous, as had been done by a former regulation.
The words "maximum hazard" indicated that such explosives were ex-
tremely dangerous.
In United States v. Boyce Motor Lines, 1 the Federal District Court
construed the phrase "so far as practicable," it is used in a regulation
of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring: "Drivers of motor
vehicles transporting any explosives, inflammable liquid, inflammable
compressed gas or poisonous gas to avoid 'so far as practicable' driving
into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds assembled,
streetcar tracks, tunnels, viaducts and dangerous crossings," to mean so
far as commercially practicable from standpoint of those engaged in the
trucking business.
In the same case, United States v. Boyce Motor Lines,3 2 the phrase
"where feasible," as used in the regulation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission was interpreted to mean where physically feasible from the
standpoint of the operation of the motor vehicle.
Also, the case of Houff Transfer v. United States,33 defined the term
"dangerous articles," as used in an interstate motor carrier's certificate
giving the carrier the right to transport general commodities but, ex-
cepting explosives and dangerous articles, as not only meaning dangerous
explosives, but including inflammable liquids, and dangerous articles
other than explosives.
The state and federal courts may take judicial notice of the Interstate
Commerce Commission regulations. In Huckleberry v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.,34 judicial notice was taken of the Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations by the state court and the railroad could plead neither
ignorance, nor unreasonableness, of the Commission's regulations.
Also, in Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Housewrecking & Sal-
vage Co.,"3 the Federal District Court took judicial notice of the contents
of a pamphlet issued by the United States Government Bureau of Ex-
plosives.
The Interstate Commerce Commission regulations may be used as
evidence in civil actions. In Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc.,3 6 where
31. Supra note 16.
32. Id.
33. Supra note 28.
34. Supra note 24.
35. 40 F. Supp. 378 (W.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd 129 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1942).
36. 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 6:131
TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES ACT
the trial court in a wrongful death case gave no instructions as to
negligence per se, the court could properly permit the jury to consider
breach of the I.C.C. regulations as evidence of negligence, although the
decedent may not have been within the class intended to be protected
by the regulations.
Guilty knowledge or intent is mandatory under the statute.3 7 In United
States v. Deer,8 where statute3 expressly makes guilty knowledge an
essential element of the offense, the prosecution's failure to allege in the
indictment that the Acts claimed to constitute such an offense were done
by the offender knowingly, rendered the indictment fatally defective.
However, in United States v. Chicago Exp., Inc.,40 a truck driver's
knowledge of the nature of the load was imputed to his corporate em-
ployer for the purpose of applying regulation requiring placarded trucks
in certain cases.
The United States v. Chicago Exp., Inc. 1 case was a prosecution for
failing to placard with warning signs a truck loaded with a dangerous
poison as required by a valid regulation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The government proved that the defendant violated the
regulation knowingly and intended to do what it did. The evidence es-
tablished that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the regula-
tion when it transported the poison and hence the government sustained
the burden of proof.
The prosecution was not as fortunate in United States v. Deer,42
where an indictment charged that the defendant shipped a truck con-
taining a loaded rifle on an interstate carrier in violation of the former
provisions of section 835 [now section 834] of title 18. The Federal
District Court held that the indictment charging the violation of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission regulation for safe transportation of ex-
plosives and other dangerous articles was fatally defective because it
did not specifically state or contain allegations warranting a fair inference
that the defendant knowingly violated such regulation.
Another problem involves the question whether past or prior convic-
tions are admissible into evidence in a regulation-violation case? In
United States v. Chicago Exp., Inc.,43 a prosecution of a trucking corpo-
ration for violation of a regulation requiring that trucks carrying dan-
gerous commodities be placarded, evidence of prior convictions for
37. 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1940) and 49 C.F.R. §§ 73.58(a) (b) (c) and 73.101.
38. 131 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
39. Supra note 37.
40. 273 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1960).
41. 172 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. III. 1959), aff'd 273 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1960).
42. Supra note 38.
43. Supra note 40.
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similar offenses was admissible to show knowledge or intent by the de-
fendant.
A similar question arises as to what is required to support the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction for violation of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission regulation? In St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.
v. United States," prosecution of a common carrier for violating regula-
tions of the Interstate Commerce Commission dealing with labeling of
motor vehicles and trailers transporting dangerous substances and ship-
ping papers, the government was required to prove that the carrier,
aware of the dangerous nature of the batteries it transported, deliberately
chose to transport them without placarding its truck or labeling its
shipping papers, or that carrier willfully neglected to take proper pre-
cautions in order to prevent dangerous articles from being transported
in violation of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations.
In United States v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co.,45 the government's evi-
dence was insufficient to establish that the railroad knowingly violated
the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulation in regard to place-
ment of a car placarded explosives, by permitting the placarded car to
become the second car from the engine on a certain train.
In United States v. A & P Trucking Corp.,46 a prosecution for viola-
tion of regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring
markings or placards on motor vehicles transporting flammable liquids
under certain conditions and defining (as determined by flash point from
Tagliabue's open-cup tester, as used for test of burning oils) at or below
temperature of 80 degrees F., the government was bound to establish
the violation of such regulations by use of a Tagliabue's open-cup tester
and not by use of the closed-cup method.
In the past, as all of the above cases indicate, the legal system has
been able to solve the social problems arising from the scientific dis-
covery of explosive materials. The judicial system begins to operate
after the existence of the social problems has been patently demonstrated
clearly, the legal system cannot accurately predict what social problems
will come into existence and, therefore, it properly will hesitate to decide
social problems which it cannot anticipate. Is the legal system judicially
or legislatively able to cope with the devastating damages likely to arise
from an inadvertent explosion of a truck loaded with dynamite, an atomic
bomb, or a nuclear reactor? On August 7, 1959, such an explosion oc-
curred in Roseburg, Oregon, in a truck loaded with dynamite and nitro-
carbonitrate. The vehicle, a private carrier, had been parked and left
44. 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955).
45. 225 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
46. Supra note 17.
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unattended in downtown Roseburg. Its explosion at 1:15 a.m. brought
death to at least 13 persons, injury to 125 others, and property damage
estimated at $12 million.4 The legal profession should be thinking and
acting with regard to indemnification suits arising out of this type of
catastrophe.
SAFETY DETERMINATIONS
The Interstate Commerce Commission is charged with the respon-
sibility to make such studies, conduct such investigations, obtain such
information, and hold such hearings as it may deem necessary or proper
to assist it in exercising any authority provided under the Transportation
of Explosives Act.48 For such purposes the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, and by sub-
poena to require any person to appear and testify, or to appear and
produce documents, or both, at any designated place.49 Pursuant to the
statutory authority under the act, public hearings concerning regula-
tions contained in the Transportation of Explosives Act have been held
by the Interstate Commerce Commission at frequent intervals for mat-
ters of safety determinations.5" At these hearings evidence has been intro-
duced in favor of proposed changes or additions, and many protests
against their adoption have also been heard. However, final action also
may be taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission without a hearing,
following 20 days notice by the Interstate Commerce Commission of
proposed changes or additions, or without such notice, as conditions ap-
pear to warrant.51
The Interstate Commerce Commission has prepared an exhaustive
commodity list of explosives and other dangerous articles containing the
shipping name or description of all articles subject to the Transporta-
tion of Explosives Act.12 These regulations passed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission apply to shippers,5 carriers by rail freight,54
carriers by rail express,55 rail carriers in baggage service,58 all shipments
made by way of common, contract, or private carriers by public high-
way, 57 shipping container specifications," and specifications for tank
47. 106 Cong. Rec. 15551 (1960) (remarks of Senator Porter).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 835(b) (1966).
49. Id.
50. 49 C.F.R. § 71.7 (1967); 29 Fed. Reg. 18653 (1964).
51. Id.
52. 49 C.F.R. § 72 (1967); 29 Fed. Reg. 18653 (1964).
53. Id. at § 73; Id. at 18668.
54. Id. at § 74; Id. at 18774.
55. Id. at § 75; Id. at 18793.
56. Id. at § 76; Id. at 18794.
57. Id. at § 77; Id. at 18795.
58. Id. at § 78; Id. at 18813.
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cars."9 The Interstate Commerce Commission's regulations cover the
preparation of explosives and other dangerous articles for transportation
by common carriers by rail freight, rail express, rail baggage, highway
or water; construction of containers, packaging, weight, marking, label-
ing when required, billing, and shipper's certificate of compliance, with
these regulations; also, cars, loading, storage, billing, placarding, and
movement thereof by rail.8 0
The Interstate Commerce Commission is in the process of implement-
ing the modified Transportation of Explosives Act through its regulatory
power, and has been placing emphasis upon education and enforcement,
along with investigation and research, into the basic causes for all types
of motor carrier safety. Only one accident in which explosives were det-
onated while in transit by motor vehicle was reported to the Interstate
Commerce Commission since the Act was passed. It occurred on June 13,
1961, near Stockton, California. A tractor semi-trailer transporting class
B explosives consisting of military ammunition, in interstate commerce,
caught fire when an inside tire on the trailer became flat and overheated.
Although the fire and explosion of ammunition continued for approxi-
mately one and one-half hours, no injuries resulted. It was the first ex-
plosion to occur in the transportation of explosives by motor vehicle
since the August 7, 1959, explosion of blasting materials on the truck
of a private motor carrier in Roseburg, Oregon. 1 However, some acci-
dents occurred in the transportation by motor vehicle of other dangerous
materials during the same period.2 Regulations by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission come much too slowly. The Interstate Commerce
Commission's recommendations were made for the first time in the annual
report for 1954 and were repeated until 1960 when the Act in its present
form was adopted.
Improvement, in respect to the interval of time, has taken place in the
field of atomic energy regarding nuclear incidents. Congress has had
hearings and passed the Price-Anderson Act.", This Act provides that
the aggregate liability of the Atomic Energy Commission for a single
nuclear incident to persons injured thereby, including the reasonable costs
of investigating and settling claims and defending suits for damage, shall
not exceed the sum of $500,000,000, together with the amount of financial
protection required by the licensee or contractor. The aggregate liability
shall in no event exceed the sum of $560,000,000. If the nuclear incident
occurs outside the United States, the aggregate liability shall not exceed
$100,000,000, together with the amount of financial protection required
of the contractor.
59. Id. at § 79; Id. at 18995.
60. Id. at § 71.1; Id. at 18652.
61. Seventy-Fifth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission at 143 (1961).
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1966).
[Vol. 6:131
TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES ACT
When the United States Government appropriated $15-16 billion for
research and development in 1966, it was subsidizing and controlling
various segments of our economy. 4 Something, other than the market
place; namely, the Bureaucrats and university professors, appearing
before congressional and administrative committees, were beginning to
determine what the safety standards should be for our society. Some
science experts that testify before these committees have lost their inde-
pendence of thought because they are paid government consultants.
Scientists at the university level, who receive research grants in some
form, and those scientists actually serving on the President's Science
Advisory Committee at the Executive level are two groups which have
become government-oriented.6 5 This is resulting in a monolithic type of
government and is forcing Congress to deal with problems they do not
fully understand. Congress is abdicating its responsibility by relying on
these scientists exclusively. This, in effect, has changed our concept of
representative democracy. Experience has shown that scientists cannot
agree among themselves as to what is sound scientific policy, for example,
the famous Tizard-Lindemann feud in England,66 and their social policy
judgments have fared no better, for example, the oceanography program
in this country as compared with outer space appropriations.67 Since the
lawyers still maintain their independence, it is submitted that the legal
profession should step forward to close the science gap which presently
exists between the physical and social sciences in this critical technologi-
cal age. The time lag before the courts enjoin or compensate the victim
or the legislature takes any action should no longer be tolerated. Tradi-
tionally, the lawyers, and not the scientists, have been the policy makers.
CONCLUSION
The Transportation of Explosives Act was selected to illustrate the
time lag that exists between the social and physical sciences. The original
Act was passed in 1908 and served its purpose for 52 years, when an
overall revision in the light of technological advances which have been
made in this field and the continued trend toward an increased use of
motor vehicles in the transportation of explosives and other dangerous
articles, and the new Act which was enacted in 1960. Primarily, this Act
came about as a result of the Roseburg, Oregon affair. The old Act did
not, for example, apply to contract and private carriers. It was amended
to include these carriers and remove the anomaly of having motor com-
mon carriers subject to maximum penalties of $10,000 or 10 years im-
prisonment, or both, for violations of the original Transportation of Ex-
plosives Act, while subjecting contract and private carriers to a maximum
penalty of only $500 under section 222(a) of the Interstate Commerce
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Act, for the very same offense. Revision was necessary to remove any
doubt respecting the Interstate Commerce Commission's authority to
prescribe regulations concerning transportation of radioactive and nu-
clear materials. The Interstate Commerce Commission was prescribing
regulations covering the transportation of such materials by classifying
them as "poisons." No specific mention of these items was made in the
old Act. Further provisions were necessary to include the transportation
of etiological agents, such as live viruses and bacteria, which could not
be classified as "poisons" because poisons consist only of dead matter.
Additional changes, principally of a definitional and technical nature,
were deemed necessary and advisable.
The role of the technological expert in the social policy-making and
safety-determination factors has been overly exaggerated. Scientists are
unable to agree among themselves on scientific policy and a fortiori are
in no better position than the lawyer to formulate social policy. The
feeling of many still persists that science has replaced religion and the
humanities. Unfortunately, the 30 year time lag from an invention to
social regulation is increasing because of research and technological ad-
vances. However, it is not too late for the lawyer to recapture his policy-
making role from the technologist by anticipating and proposing solu-
tions to problems certain to arise in the future as a result of scientific
discoveries and.inventions. Undoubtedly, our archaic legal system could
stand some modern streamlining to cope with the problems of the scien-
tific age, and the lawyers should stop seeking "undeviating universals"
and "catch the spirit of the creative scientist," as advocated by Judge
Jerome Frank.
The legal profession should be ready, willing and able to meet the
challenge of closing the legislative gap by anticipating and solving the
problems of mass injuries which are likely to occur because of the trans-
portation of explosives, radioactive materials or etiological agents in
interstate commerce. No protective provision presently exists in the Fed-
eral Transportation of Explosives Act and, perhaps, Congress has found
a solution when they passed the atomic energy indemnity legislation-
Price-Anderson Act. Further study and research in this legal liability
field remains necessary.
